EREIGNIS

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In order to see what is at issue, one must set aside, from the outset, a prejudice that, now more than ever, we are inclined to bring to bear on our consideration. One could apprehend the matter in such a way that, in φωνή and in λóγος, actuality is grasped in a definite respect, namely, that the world is there from a definite “point of view,” from a point of view relative to the “subject,” that is, the world is encountered only from a “subjective point of view,” not genuinely in itself, as if it were a matter of a definite mode of apprehending the world. This orientation toward subject and object must be fundamentally set aside. Not only is it the case that these basic concepts, subject/object, and what they mean, do not appear in Greek philosophy, but even the orientation of subject/object in Greek philosophy is meaningless insofar as they are not concerned with characterizing a mode of apprehending the world. Instead, their concern is characterizing being in it. And furthermore, one may not approach the entire analysis of the encounter-characters of the world as though there were a world in itself, and animals and human beings would have a definite portion of that world, which they always see from their own definite point of view. It is also incorrect to speak of a “world of animals” and a “world of human beings.” The issue is not modes of apprehending actuality according to definite points of view; rather the issue is being-in-the-world. Thus, since the world is encountered through a definite disposition of living things, animals and human beings are in their world. The relatedness of animals to the world is precisely that which brings animals in their being genuinely into being-there. Insofar as one takes apprehending, grasping the world as a general topic of investigation, one must be clear about the fact that grasping, and apprehending the world presuppose a being-in-the-world. Apprehending the world is a definite possibility of being in it; only by being in the world can one apprehend it. With the subject/object distinction, one does not get at the facts of the matter; the basic phenomenon of being-in-the-world does not come into view. For we must always keep in mind that one must set oneself free from the traditional ways of posing philosophical questions. (GA18:56-57)

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