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--- estudos:dahlstrom:dahlstrom-2001270-272-ser-com-os-outros-mitsein-mitdasein [26/01/2026 15:08] – mccastro
+++ estudos:dahlstrom:dahlstrom-2001270-272-ser-com-os-outros-mitsein-mitdasein [09/02/2026 20:16] (current) – external edit 127.0.0.1
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+===== SER-COM-OS-OUTROS (MITSEIN, MITDASEIN) (2001:270-272) =====
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+(...) A afirmação de Kant de que "os seres humanos existem como fins em si mesmos" é suposto referir-se precisamente ao que Heidegger designa como "cuidado", nomeadamente, "que o que está em jogo para o ser humano é o seu próprio ser". No entanto, o objetivo de Kant não é apenas sublinhar a distinção entre coisas e pessoas, mas também apontar para "um mundo de inteligências". Do mesmo modo, o conceito de cuidado de Heidegger, precisamente ao determinar o mundo da preocupação, também inclui aquilo a que ele chama "solicitude", "cuidar dos outros" ou, em suma, "estar-com-os-outros". "O mundo do ser-aí é ser-com-os-outros" (SZ 118). É certo que, tanto nas Conferências Prolegômenos como em Ser e tempo, ao abordar "quem é o ser-no-mundo", Heidegger rejeita a ideia de que a resposta a esta questão tenha qualquer "avaliação moral" (GA20 337, 389, 391). No entanto, a referência à determinação de Kant dos seres humanos como "propósitos em si mesmos" faz mais do que meramente sugerir que a descrição de Heidegger do "ser-com-os-outros" como um aspecto central do ser-aí pretende recapitular, em certo sentido, o que de outra forma é visto como fundamental para a ética. De fato, nalgumas das passagens mais exasperantes de Ser e Tempo, Heidegger pede aos seus leitores que diferenciem o "propósito puramente ontológico" da sua interpretação de uma "crítica moralizante do ser-aí quotidiano", apenas para conceder mais tarde que "uma concepção ôntica específica da existência genuína, um ideal factual do ser-aí", está subjacente à interpretação. (SZ 167, 310)
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+“We designate as care the basic type of being of an entity that is such that what is at stake for it in its being is this being itself’ (L 220). Heidegger did Not himself draft an ethics in any traditional sense. Hence, it is worthy of note when he remarks that this phenomenon of care is precisely what Kant has in mind in working out the basis for the so-called humanistic formulation of the categorial imperative: “human beings exist (271) as purposes in themselves.” This remark presents Heidegger with the opportunity to point out, once again, the necessity of the metacategorial distinction. According to Heidegger, Kant attempts in vain with standard ontological categories to present the distinctively human manner of being. Kant’s attempt fails, not because the concepts are old or traditional, but because such categories are suited to things in nature other than human beings.
+There is an additional reason why Heidegger’s reference to Kant’s efforts to provide a foundation for the categorial imperative is particularly instructive in this connection. Kant’s claim that “human beings exist as purposes in themselves” is supposed to refer precisely to what Heidegger designates as “care,” namely, “that what is at stake for the human being is his or her being itself.” Kant’s aim, however, is not only to emphasize the distinction between things and persons, but also to point to “a world of intelligences.” Similarly, Heidegger’s concept of care, precisely in determining the world of concern, also includes what he dubs “solicitude,” “caring-for-others,” or, in short, “being-with-others.” “The world of being-here is being-with-others” (SZ 118). To be sure, in the Prolegomena Lectures as in Being and Time, in the course of addressing “who being-in-the-world is,” Heidegger rejects the idea that the answer in this connection has any “moral evaluation” (P 337, 389, 391). Nevertheless, the reference to Kant’s determination of human beings as “purposes in themselves” does more than merely suggest that Heidegger’s account of “being-with-others” as a central aspect of being-here is meant to recapitulate in some sense what otherwise is viewed as foundational for ethics. Indeed, in some of the more exasperating passages (272) of Being and Time, Heidegger pleads with his readers to differentiate the “purely ontological purpose” of his interpretation from a “moralizing critique of everyday being-here,” only to concede later that “a specific ontic conception of genuine existence, a factual ideal of being-here,” does underlie the interpretation.
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+[DAHLSTROM, Daniel O. Heidegger’s concept of truth. Cambridge: Cambridge university press, 2001]
+{{tag>Dahlstrom}}